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Abstract
Background: Several biomedical ontologies cover the domain of biological functions, 
including molecular and cellular functions. However, there is currently no publicly available 
ontology of anatomical functions.
Consequently, no explicit relation between anatomical structures and their functions is
expressed in the anatomy ontologies that are available for various species. Such an
explicit relation between anatomical structures and their functions would be useful both
for defining the classes of the anatomy and the phenotype ontologies accurately.
Results: We provide an ontological analysis of functions and functional abnormalities. 
From this analysis, we derive an approach to the automatic extraction of anatomical 
functions from existing ontologies which uses a combination of natural language 
processing, graph-based analysis of the ontologies and formal inferences. Additionally, we 
introduce a new relation to link material objects to processes that realize the function of 
these objects. This relation is introduced to avoid a needless duplication of processes 
already covered by the Gene Ontology in a new ontology of anatomical functions.
Conclusions: Ontological considerations on the nature of functional abnormalities and 
their representation in current phenotype ontologies show that we can extract a skeleton 
for an ontology of anatomical functions by using a combination of process, phenotype and 
anatomy ontologies automatically. We identify several limitations of the current ontologies 
that still need to be addressed to ensure a consistent and complete representation of 
anatomical functions and their abnormalities.
Availability: The source code and results of our analysis are available at http://bioonto.de.
Background
The notion of function is important throughout biology. It is used to characterize biological
sequences [1], cell types [2], anatomical structures [3] and to annotate gene products [4].
Functions are also used in the description of phenotypes of functionings, i.e., observable
phenomena regarding the functioning or malfunctioning of biological entities. These phe-
notypes play an important role in the discovery of gene functions and in the description of
abnormalities, diseases, signs and symptoms.
Phenotype ontologies
We define a phenotype as any observable characteristic of an organism, part of an organism
or process in which an organism or one of its parts is involved. Phenotypes may include
both structural and behavioral properties. Functional phenotypes are either observable
characteristics of a process that realizes a function of an organism or a part of the organism,
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ing a function).
Phenotype ontologies for mouse and human phenotypes were developed to annotate
research databases of mouse and human phenotypes. The Mammalian Phenotype
Ontology (MPO) focuses on mutant mouse phenotypes [5] and the Human Phenotype
Ontology (HPO) focuses on Mendelian diseases in man [6]. They make an explicit refer-
ence to anatomy ontologies in their cross-product definitions [7], and implicit reference
to the anatomy ontologies in the naming of their categories.
The HPO uses the Foundational Model of Anatomy (FMA) [3] to refer to anatomical
entities in humans, and the MPO uses the Adult Mouse Anatomy Ontology (MA) [8].
These anatomy ontologies describe anatomical entities by using, among others, part-
whole relations, i.e., they focus on the anatomical structure.
Although the phenotype ontologies describe both structurally and functionally abnor-
mal phenotypes, the anatomy ontologies do not include an elaborate description of the
anatomical functions. As a consequence, although the classification of structural abnor-
malities in the phenotype ontologies follows well-defined principles, the classification of
phenotypes of functionings is often unprincipled and sometimes ambiguous. To address
the issue of representing functional phenotypes, we provide an ontology design pattern
[9] for functional abnormalities. This design pattern is applicable in phenotype ontolo-
gies, especially in the MPO and HPO. We discuss the benefits of the application of the
design pattern and relate the design pattern to the composite names of the categories in
the phenotype ontologies. Based on the category names, we apply a pattern-based
approach to extract a skeleton for an ontology of anatomical functions from a combina-
tion of the anatomy and phenotype ontologies together with the Biological Process
ontology of the Gene Ontology (GO) [4].
Biological functions
There is an ongoing discussion in the philosophy of biology and theoretical biology as to
the exact nature of a biological function. While functions of artifacts come into being
due to the intentions of a designer, biological entities have evolved over time, and biolog-
ical functions are not dependent on intentions in the same way as artifacts are.
Philosophical theories of biological functions range from reductions to causality over
social accounts of functions to the denial of the existence of biological functions. The
first two are of major importance, i.e., the causal view of biological functions and the
social view of biological functions. The major proponents of causal explanations of func-
tionality are Wright [10] and Millikan [11], while the social view is defended by Searle
[12].
Wright gives the following definition of function [10]:
Definition 1. "The function of X is Z" means
1. X is there because it does Z,
2. Z is a consequence (or result) of X's being there.
In the definition, X is a category of structures and Z is a process category, and instances
of X are involved in instances of Z. In its definition, Wright does not distinguish between
functions and the processes which realize the function. Furthermore, the definition
assumes that an entity has only one function. However, as discussed by Wright [10], the
definition can be restated for entities having multiple functions by replacing "the func-
tion of X is Z" with "a function of X is Z".
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detailed analysis is provided by Hartmann [13] and is illustrated in Figure 1. Hartmann
distinguishs three elements to the ascription of a function: the setting of a goal in the
future, the planning of how to achieve the goal, resulting in a structure that is capable of
achieving the goal through causal means. Figure 1 shows how some entity obtains a sin-
gle function, according to Hartmann [13]. For an entity to have multiple functions, the
same three steps are performed, yet the goal and the initial situation may change.
Methods
Ontology of functions
We do not choose a particular definition of biological function, and we do not add
another definition to the literature. The method we present is compatible with most
major views of function.
An analysis of how to represent functions has been provided by the Ontology of Func-
tions (OF) [14,15]. A function in the OF is described in terms of a requirement situation
type, a goal situation type and a processual role. The requirement situation type serves as
precondition for any function realization, the goal situation type is the postcondition,
and the processual role [16] is used to describe how a function bearer brings about the
goal from the requirements. One major advantage of the treatment of functions in the
OF is the explicit inclusion of preconditions for the function realizations, which serve to
model the contexts in which a function can be realized.
Function realizations
Functions can be realized multiple times. Each realization of a function is a process, and
in each realization of a function the function bearer achieves the goal of the function,
starting at a situation satisfying the preconditions of the function.
While a function is an entity that is similar to a property in that it inheres in its bearer,
a functioning is a process that is a realization of a function. For example, while the func-
tion of the heart "to pump blood" is a property that the heart has in virtue of being a
heart and in virtue of the evolutionary history of hearts, a functioning is the actual pro-
cess of pumping blood which realizes the function of the heart [17]. In particular, the
Figure 1 Three steps for function ascription. The figure shows the three conditions for the ascription of a 
single function to an entity. First, the goal of the function is established in the future. Second, the means for 
achieving the goal are selected or created. Finally, the goal can be realized by causal means, i.e., without the 
need for accessing or anticipating future states of the world.
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could be the case during a heart transplantation or during a malfunctioning of the heart.
Furthermore, the function of the heart is "to pump blood" even when the heart cannot
realize this function. Function realizations always require a disposition to realize the
function in the function bearer, while the function itself can exist without such a disposi-
tion. For our present work, we use the simple conditional analysis of dispositions [18]:
"something x is disposed at time t to give response r to stimulus s, iff, if x were to undergo
s at t, x would r".
There are other possible causes for a heart to not function, e.g., an abnormality in the
nervous system. This is not a malfunctioning of the heart. We define a function by its
preconditions and postconditions. In the case that the nervous system fails, a precondi-
tion of the heart's function is not satisfied. If this precondition was satisfied, the heart
would in fact pump blood (assuming the heart is functional).
Therefore, it is not the heart's being malfunctional but rather a non-satisfied precondi-
tion that causes the heart to not function. Within a wider context, i.e., the whole body,
this may appear to be a malfunctioning of the heart, but the original cause was elsewhere
- in the nervous system. The heart is functional, the nervous system abnormally func-
tioning. A repair or treatment of such a condition should treat the nervous system and
not the heart.
Abnormal functionings
Abnormal functionings are processes which are similar to a functioning, but which are
impaired in some way. We distinguish between abnormal functionings and malfunction-
ings: in the case of a malfunctioning, the function bearer cannot cause the goal of its
function although the preconditions for a function realization are given. An entity e has
the property of being malfunctional (with respect to the function f), if e has a function f,
but not a disposition d to realize the function f . Functions and dispositions are disjoint
categories (i.e., neither is a subcategory of the other), yet they are related in a particular
way [19]. While abnormal functionings are processes, being malfunctional is a property
of the function bearer; in the case of a malfunctional entity, no process of functioning
can occur.
There are various kinds of abnormal functionings: functionings may be more or less
effective, have unwanted side-effects or similar. We focus on the malfunctional property
here. A classification of kinds of abnormal functionings is out of the scope of this paper
and will be subject to future work.
Function and Structure
There is an important relationship between function and structure. Biological functions
are usually realized through causal processes (cf. [13] and Figure 1) and the function
bearer has developed through evolution to play a particular role in processes of a certain
kind (e.g., the role of the heart as a pump in its function to pump blood). Therefore, if the
heart - the function bearer - becomes unable to play this role in the function realization,
while everything else remains unchanged, this loss of disposition is due to a change in
the heart's structure. In general, the loss of a disposition in the case of malfunctional
entities must go along with a change in the structure of the bearer of the disposition and
function.
As a result, if e has a biological function f, and e is malfunctional with respect to f, then
e is abnormal. This pattern is already implied in the taxonomic backbones of the pheno-
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gies' categories.
The functional abnormality pattern
The functional abnormality pattern is an ontology design pattern [9] for ontologies that
classify both abnormal structural and functional phenotypes, such as both the Human
and Mammalian Phenotype Ontology.
According to the functional abnormality pattern, an abnormality of functioning (a
property of a process) implies an abnormality of the function bearer (provided that
external circumstances are normal). If multiple types of entities have the same kind of
function, then an abnormality of the functioning implies a disjunction of the abnormali-
ties of each possible kind of function bearer. On the other hand, being malfunctional (a
property of the function bearer) is a sub-category of (is-a) an abnormality of the function
bearer, and if multiple types of entities have the same function, then being malfunctional
is a sub-category of a disjunction of the abnormalities of each possible kind of function
bearer.
For example, an abnormality in HearingP processes (we use HearingF to refer to the
function, and HearingP to refer to the process realizing the function; HearingP processes
are functionings of the HearingF function) implies an abnormality of the ears, if the
function of the ears is HearingF (and only the ears have the function HearingF). If the
function of both the left ear and the right ear was HearingF, then an abnormality of
HearingP implies an abnormality of the left ear or an abnormality of the right ear. In this
case, the category "abnormality of the left ear or abnormality of the right ear" should be
named "ear abnormality" and defined as a disjunction of the two categories "abnormality
of the left ear" and "abnormality of the right ear", which are both sub-categories of "ear
abnormality".
On the other hand, the ears' being malfunctional with respect to their HearingF func-
tion is a property of the ears, and should be classified as a sub-category of Ear abnormal-
ity. The ears' being malfunctional is defined as the absence of a disposition which would
normally be present (due to the ears' having a function whose realization requires the
disposition), and the loss of a disposition entails a structural modification according to
the theory of dispositions [18]. Therefore, a loss of a disposition is a special kind of struc-
tural change of the disposition's bearer.
Naming patterns in the phenotype ontologies
Our goal is to represent functional phenotypes formally. While there is no ontology of
anatomical functions yet, such an anatomical function ontology is implied in the pheno-
type ontologies. These ontologies classify abnormal phenotypes, and in these phenotype
ontologies, abnormal functionings are usually classified as a sub-category of abnormal
structures which bear the function that is impaired. Therefore, the phenotype ontologies
can serve as a seed for the construction of an ontology of anatomical functions.
However, as the phenotype ontologies rarely define abnormal functionings formally,
the challenge is to extract the information about anatomical structures and their func-
tions from the current ontology structure, category names and definitions of the pheno-
type ontologies. Such an approach will be insufficient to create an exhaustive ontology of
anatomical functions, because only few functions are addressed in the phenotype ontol-
ogies, nor will this approach provide a high-quality ontology that is suitable for use in
applications. Instead, our goal is to extract functions that can be used as the backbone of
an ontology of formally defined function categories after a manual review process.
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analysis and formal representation of the relations between anatomical functions, their
bearers and the processes that realize the functions.
Formal representation of anatomical functions
In our formal analysis, we use the definition of the category Deafness in both the Mam-
malian and Human Phenotype Ontology as an example. The definition in the cross-
products of both ontologies is the following statement in the OBO Flatfile Format [20]:
In the OBO Flatfile Format, the definition of an ontological category is started with a
[Term] statement, followed by a unique identifier of the category. Everything following
an exclamation mark is considered to be a comment.
The GO category GO:0007605 is named "sensory perception of sound" and has a
synonym "hearing". The definition of Deafness in the two phenotype ontologies we use
in our analysis claims that Deafness is a process of HearingP in which the quality Absent
inheres. Inherence is a dependence relation between an instance of a quality and the
bearer of the quality [21].
There are several problems with the analysis of Deafness in the phenotype ontologies.
The first problem is that, according to the definition, Deafness is a process of HearingP.
Deafness seems to be something different from a process, and certainly different from a
HearingP process. An absence of hearing means that there is no HearingP process what
ever properties such a process might have. In particular, Absent cannot inhere in a non-
existing process and is arguably not a quality at all.
The second problem is that there can be an absence of hearing without there being a
case of Deafness. In a completely silent environment, both a human or a mouse will
experience an absence of HearingP even when their disposition to hear is present. More
precicely, according to the definition of Deafness, an absence of sound would also entail
Deafness.
Therefore, to represent the phenotype Deafness formally, we are faced with two chal-
lenges: there is an absence of HearingP processes and there is also an absence of the dis-
position to hear.
Using our ontological framework for representing malfunctionality, we can represent
Deafness as the ears' being malfunctional with respect to their HearingF function. How-
ever, a vital point is missing to apply our framework: an ontology of anatomical func-
tions. The absence of such an ontology is one reason for the phenotype ontologies to
model abnormal functionings by using processes from the GO.
While the anatomical functions are not yet covered in an ontology, the processes that
realize the anatomical functions are present in GO's Biological Process ontology. There-
fore, we define a new relation that we call the CC-has-function-realized-by (hf rb) rela-
tion. This relation is based on the relations CC-has-function and CC-realized-by. The
prefix CC indicates that the relation takes two ontological categories as arguments. The
relations between categories are defined using relations between individuals (II-rela-
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ogy [5]. The definition of the relation CC-has-function is given in formula 1, where E
denotes a category of Presentials (in GFO [21]), Continuants (in BFO [22]) or Endurants
(in DOLCE [23]):
According to this definition, the category E has the function (CC-relation) F if and only
if for every instance x of E there is an instance y of F such that x has the function (II-rela-
tion) y.
While the relation CC-has-function follows the standard pattern for defining relations
between categories [20], the relation CC-realized-by cannot follow the same pattern.
Applying the same pattern would require that, for every function, there is a process that
realized the function. Yet, not every function instance is realized, and, according to our
considerations about malfunctionality, not every function can be realized. Therefore, we
have to employ a different definition for the CC-realized-by relation given in formula 2.
In the formulation of the definition of the CC-realized-by relation, we assume that func-
tions are not necessarily realized, but when they are realized, then always by processes of
a certain kind.
We recognize that this claim is controversial. There may be functions that can be real-
ized by different kinds of processes. However, we assume that it is possible to find a
super-category for these kinds of processes that include all and only those process cate-
gories that can realize the function. For example, a TransportF function will always be
realized by TransportP processes (yet, arguably, not every TransportP process is a real-
ization of a TransportF function), and these TransportP processes can be of many differ-
ent kinds, all of which are sub-categories of the TransportP process category.
According to this definition, the function category F is realized by (CC-relation) the
process category P if and only if whenever an instance x of F is realized by some y, then y
is an instance of P .
With these definitions of the two relations CC-has-function and CC-realized-by, we
can give a definition for the relation CC-has-function-realized-by:
This relation is a connection of the two previously defined relations with an implicit
function as argument. The relation CC-has-function-realized-by holds between the cat-
egory E and the category P if and only if E has the function F and F is realized by P .
CC-has-function
II-has-function
( , ) ( ( , )
(
E F x instanceOf x E
y
⇔ ∀ →
∃ ( , ) ( , )))x y instanceOf y F∧
(1)
CC-realized-by
II-realized-by
( , ) , ( ( , )
( ,
F P x y instanceOf x F
x
⇔ ∀ ∧
y instanceceOf y P) ( , ))→
(2)
CC-hfrb CC-hasfunction
CC-realizedBy
( , ) ( ( , )
( , ))
E P F E F
F P
⇔ ∃ ∧
(3)
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relation can be defined in OWL2 as a connection between the two CC-relations by using
a property chain:
Such a definition can be used in an OWL ontology in which ontological categories are
in the domain of discourse (cf. [21,24,25]), i.e., in which there are OWL classes which
have ontological categories as their instances.
A similar connection between the two relations II-has-function and II-realized-by is
very different from the relation between the categories: it is a relation between an entity
with a function that is in fact (and currently) realized by a process:
Application to anatomy and phenotype ontologies
We apply the framework for representing functional abnormalities to the automated
extraction of anatomical functions from the HPO and MPO. For this purpose, we exploit
the naming of the categories in the phenotype ontologies.
We make use of three types of ontologies in our approach:
1. the phenotype ontology that contains abnormal functional phenotypes, either the
HPO or the MPO,
2. an anatomy ontology that contains the structures affected by the malfunctionings
represented in the phenotype ontology, either the Adult Mouse Anatomy Ontology
[5] or the Foundational Model of Anatomy [3], and
3. a process ontology, which contains the processes that realize an anatomical func-
tion.
Since functional abnormalities are already classified as subclasses of structural abnor-
malities in the phenotype ontologies that we consider, we search for a pattern in the phe-
notype ontologies where
1. a category C in the phenotype ontology has a name name(C); e.g., Hearing abnor-
mality (HP:0000364),
2. in name(C), the name or synonym name(D) of a GO Biological Process category D
occurs as a substring and name(D) is delimited by whitespaces in name(C); e.g.,
Hearing (GO:0007605),
3. the category C is a sub-category of a category E with a name name(E); e.g., Abnor-
mality of the ears (HP:0000598),
4. the name name(E) contains the name or synonym name(F) of a category F from
the anatomy ontology and name(F) is delimited by whitespaces in name(E); e.g., Ear
(FMA:52780).
As a consequence, we find abnormalities of GO processes that are classified as sub-cat-
egories of abnormalities of anatomical structures in the phenotype ontologies.
To exclude categories that are named after diseases or do not describe abnormalities,
we only consider the categories of the phenotype ontologies which contain "abnormal",
"impaired", "decreased" or "increased" in their name or synonyms and exclude the rest
CC-hfrb CC-has-function CC-realized-by=  (4)
II-hfrb II-hasFunction
II-realizedBy
( , ) ( ( , )
( , ))
e p z e z
z p
⇔ ∃ ∧
(5)
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mental process), GO:0043473 (pigmentation) and GO:0001503 (ossification) from
our analysis (see Discussion section).
Figure 2 shows an overview of our extraction pipeline. To match the names of the cate-
gories, we stemmed all category labels and synonyms in the input ontologies by using the
PlingStemmer [26]. The PlingStemmer generates the singular forms of English words.
Furthermore, all category labels were reduced to their lower case form before the match-
ing was carried out.
Results
Using the HPO and the FMA, we could extract 25 structure-process pairs. These pairs
and their evaluation are available at our project page. Using the MPO and the MA ontol-
ogies, we extracted 331 structure-process pairs. A selection of the pairs which we
extracted and which do stand in the CC-has-function-realized-by relation is shown in
Table 1. In Table 2 we show pairs that do not stand in the CC-has-function-realized-by
relation. A manual evaluation of our results with respect to the phenotype ontologies
showed that we reach a precision of 75% for the HPO and FMA and a precision of
77.27% for the MPO and MA.
However, these precision values are only valid within the context of the reference
ontologies. For example, the CC-has-function-realized-by relation holds between Ear
(FMAID:52780) and Hearing (GO:0007605) according to the HPO, although ears only
partially contribute to Hearing. The quality of the extraction results could be improved
by ameliorating the background data upon which the extraction is carried out.
Discussion
Functions of parts
Although we successfully applied our proposed ontology pattern to harvest a basic
ontology of anatomical functions from the phenotype ontologies by using naming pat-
terns in the ontologies, there are cases in which our pattern yields incorrect results. In
particular, the relation between functions and parts of structures remains a topic for fur-
ther research.
We have argued that an abnormality of a function should be a sub-category of an
abnormality of the bearer of the function. However, there may be cases where the bearer
of the function is not included in the anatomy ontology or the abnormality of the func-
tion bearer is not included in the phenotype ontology. Instead, a structure of which the
function bearer is a part or an abnormality of such a structure is included. The functional
abnormality pattern is valid if we assume that the abnormality of the part is an abnor-
mality of the whole. This assumption is supported by the phenotype ontologies. Never-
theless, to achieve completeness of both the anatomy ontologies and the phenotype
Figure 2 Processing sequence of the input categories.
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beneficial to include the abnormality of the function bearer whenever an abnormality of
a function is included in the phenotype ontologies.
Text and naming problems
While processing the phenotype ontologies, we discovered several naming problems.
First, plural forms are apparently randomly mixed with singular forms of the same term.
For example, the label of MP:0003677 is "abnormal ear lobe", while the label of its sub-
category MP:0003678 is "absent ear lobes" (plural). The same holds for HP:0000598
(abnormality of the ears) and HP:0000370 (abnormality of the middle ear). We suggest
to use the plural form only in the case of explicitly disjunctively defined categories. For
example, a category that is defined as the disjunction of the categories "abnormality of
the left ear" and "abnormality of the right ear" may be called "abnormality of the ears".
Another difficulty is the mixture of structural and functional abnormalities as category
labels. For example, the category HP:0000251 is labeled "abnormality of tear glands
OR tear production". This name mixes structural and functional abnormalities: tear
glands are an anatomical structure, while tear production is a process that realizes a
function (the function "to produce tears"). To improve the usability and the possibilities
for automatic processing of the phenotype ontologies, we suggest a separation of func-
tion and structure-based abnormalities. For example, the category HP:0000251 should
be split into two distinct categories, one labelled "abnormality of tear glands", the other
"abnormality of tear production".
Table 1: Selection of true positive matches
Structure Process
cardiovascular system anatomical structure morphogenesis
uterus angiogenesis
blood vessel cell migration
blood coagulation
female reproductive system diestrus
reproductive system fertilization
pancreas glucagon secretion
mammary gland lactation
The true positive matches were extracted using the Adult Mouse Anatomy Ontology and the 
Mammalian Phenotype Ontology.
Table 2: Selection of false positive matches extracted from mouse ontologies
Structure Process
blood morphogenesis of a branching structure
immune system t-cell apoptosis
trunk biological regulation
pancreas cell differentiation
blood vessel endothelial cell differentiation
Table 1: The false positive matches were extracted using the Adult Mouse Anatomy Ontology and the 
Mammalian Phenotype Ontology.
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gory labels. The MPO contains the categories "abnormal hearing physiology"
(MP:0001963), "hearing disability" and "hearing impairment" (exact synonyms for
MP:0001965), "deafness" (MP:0001967) and "impaired hearing" (MP:0006325). The
development of a naming convention would not only serve automatic processing of the
ontologies, but also help to improve the clarity of the phenotype ontologies.
The current use of polysemous words is one of the main drawback we face when trying
to extract functions out of the phenotype ontology. Ossification, for example, can be
understood both as the process of creating bone tissue and as a property of a bone (the
outcome of the process). Thus, while bone ossification relates to the ossification process,
skull ossification (HP:0002703) relates to the state of the skull, i.e., the result of the
ossification process of the skull. Similarly, pigmentation is used widely as a property and
not as the process of pigmentation.
Finally, a major problem for the phenotype ontologies is the use of "absent" as a prop-
erty. In English, "absent" is used as an attributive adjective, and this is one reason why
"absent" is present in some ontologies of qualities, in particular the phenotypic quality
ontology PATO (PATO:0000462). In most ontologies, such as DOLCE [23], GFO [21]
or BFO [22], qualities are dependent on a bearer, an entity of which they are a quality.
The meaning of "absent", however, entails that there is no such bearer. When "absent" is
used in "absent appendix", "absent nipple" or "absent hearing", it does not correspond to
an ontological quality [24]. While this fact is increasingly being taken into consideration
by the phenotype ontologies in the definition of categories pertaining to the absence of
structures, "absent" is still used as a quality in the definition of categories of absent pro-
cesses (or functions). These categories should be carefully examined and their definition
made clear. They can be defined formally by using the functional abnormality pattern
[19], which uses a form of the lacks relation [27] together with an ontological analysis of
functions and dispositions.
The problem of "absent" is not a problem of the phenotype ontologies alone. The
PATO ontology also includes "absent" as a quality, and it should be removed from the
PATO.
Ontology problems
Our analysis is hindered by the lack of categories or synonyms for category names in
GO's Biological Process Ontology. For example, tear production, cardiac conduction,
hair pigmentation or taste sensation are not in the GO, yet their existence is indicated by
reference to these processes in the phenotype ontologies. An extension of the GO
together with a consistent naming of the categories in the phenotype ontologies could
improve our analysis and the clarity of the phenotype ontologies.
The need for an ontology of anatomical functions
One major problem in our analysis is the lack of an anatomical functions ontology. The
phenotype ontologies imply that HearingF would be a function of the ears, by stating
that an abnormality in HearingF is a sub-category of Abnormality of the ears. However,
the ears can be normal and be functioning normally and still there may be an absence of
HearingP. In particular, Deafness may be the result of an abnormality of the ears, or it
may be the result of an abnormality in the nervous system. For example, an abnormality
in the brain can impair HearingF just as well as an abnormality in the ears can. The ears
only partially contribute to HearingP, and not every abnormality of HearingF is an
abnormality of the ears. Therefore, the ears and HearingP do not stand in the CC-has-
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which, if realized, is realized by processes that may be part of HearingP processes, but
are not necessarily HearingP processes themselves, nor are they always part of HearingP
processes. Instead, the function of the ears is realized by processes of the kind Detection
of mechanical stimulus involved in sensory perception of sound (GO:0050910), which
are a part-of Hearing in the GO.
To prevent this kind of erroneous naming or definition of categories, an explicit rela-
tion between anatomical structures and their functions is needed, on which the category
definitions in the phenotype ontologies should be based. Such an explicit relation
between structures and their functions can be achieved by the introduction of an ontol-
ogy of anatomical functions and the use of the CC-has-function relation, or without the
introduction of an ontology of anatomical functions and the use of the CC-has-func-
tion-realized-by relation.
One advantage of our introduction of the relation CC-has-function-realized-by is
that a needless duplication of the processes in the GO is avoided. In particular, many
functions do not need to be named explicitly because the processes in the GO are
defined as processes that realize a given function. A difficulty in hiding the function by
using the CC-has-function-realized-by relation occurs when one kind of function can
be realized by multiple kinds of processes. In this case, a new super-category for all the
kinds of processes that may realize the function must be introduced and used as the
argument in the CC-has-function-realized-by relation. This new category would be
defined as the category of all processes that realize a given function - a common form of
defining processes.
However, a separate ontology of anatomical functions may provide benefits over indi-
rectly relating structures and processes by using CC-has-function-realized-by. With
the availability of an ontology of anatomical functions, the inner structure of functions
can be represented [14], relations between functions themselves can be established (such
as functions that support or prevent other functions [15]) and properties can be
assigned to functions.
Suggestions for future development of phenotype ontologies
Overall, our analysis of means for extracting and representing functions led to the dis-
covery of several shortcomings of current ontologies. The following list epitomizes these
shortcomings and presents suggestions for the future modelling of biomedical ontolo-
gies in general and phenotype ontologies in particular.
• Naming conventions: plural and singular form seem to be used inconsistenly in cat-
egories labels. For example, MPO contains the categories labeled "abnormal ear lobe"
(MP:0003677) and "absent ear lobes" (MP:0003678). We suggest to use the plural
form exclusively for naming categories defined disjunctively.
• Mixture of functional and structural abnormalities: several categories are labeled
with terms that denote a mix of structural and functional abnormalities. An example
for such a mixture is the category label "abnormality of tear glands OR tear produc-
tion" (HP:0000251). To provide a clear classification founded in ontological princi-
ples and to enable automatic processing, we suggest to split such classes into distinct
classes: Abnormality of tear glands and Abnormality of tear production.
• Use of "Absent" as property: previous work has pointed out that Absent is not an
ontological property (see e.g., [24,27]). We propose the use of a variant of the lacks
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enable consistent reasoning on them.
• Missing categories: Some categories implied in the phenotype ontologies are absent
in the GO. These categories include Hair pigmentation and Taste sensation. Adding
these categories to the GO would improve the automatic extraction of cross-prod-
ucts to link phenotype ontologies with the GO, and the use of the CC-has-function-
realized-by relation in the anatomy ontologies provides a method to discover the
missing categories in the GO.
• Ambiguous category names: Some terms have been used in literature to denote
both processes and states. An example for such a term is "ossification", which can
refer to the process of Ossification (GO:0001503) or a property of a bone which is
the outcome of such a process. To ensure that terms in the phenotype ontology are
monosemous, we would suggest the addition of more specific terms to class labels.
For example, we would suggest altering the label "abnormal bone ossification"
(MP:0008271) into "abnormal bone ossification process" or "abnormal bone ossifi-
cation state" as required.
• Mapping of parts to functions of whole: Some of the functions of anatomical struc-
tures implied by the phenotype ontologies are mappings from a part of a complex
anatomical structure to the function realized by the whole of the complex structure.
For example, Hearing abnormality (HP:0000364) being a subclass of Abnormality
of the ears (HP:0000598) implies that a function of the ears is realized by Hearing
processes. Rather, a function of the ears is realized by a part of Hearing processes,
namely by Detection of mechanical stimulus involved in sensory perception of sound
(GO:0050910). The use of the CC-has-function-realized-by relation in the anat-
omy ontologies can help to prevent these errors.
Conclusions
We present an ontology design pattern for the representation of functional abnormali-
ties. The design pattern is applicable to the Human Phenotype Ontology and the Mam-
malian Phenotype Ontology. We show how to model anatomical functions by using
processes from the Gene Ontology that may realize these functions. For this purpose, we
introduce a new relation between categories of anatomical structures and process cate-
gories. This relation states that an anatomical structure has some function that is real-
ized by a process of a certain kind. Using this relation, functions can be specified without
the explicit introduction of an ontology of anatomical functions.
We evaluated our method by exploiting the naming of categories from the phenotype
ontologies to extract structure-process pairs that stand in the relation we introduced. We
extracted several structure-process pairs from the Mammalian Phenotype Ontology
together with the Adult Mouse Anatomy Ontology, and from the Human Phenotype
Ontology together with the Foundational Model of Anatomy.
In our analyis, we found several problems with the phenotype ontologies. In particular,
we discovered ambiguous namings of the categories and suggest the use of a naming
convention for the categories in the phenotype ontologies. Additionally, we found a
number of problematic formal definitions of categories in the phenotype ontologies.
Most of these are categories of the malfunctional type: the loss of the disposition to per-
form a certain function. The use of our ontological framework would permit an
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knowledge extraction from the phenotype ontologies.
Competing interests
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Authors' contributions
JK, RH and AN conceived of the study, RH and AN formalized, implemented and evaluated the method, JK supervised the
project. RH and AN drafted the manuscript. All authors read and approved the final manuscript.
Acknowledgements
We are grateful to Heinrich Herre, Roberto Poli and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on previous versions 
of this manuscript.
We acknowledge funding from the Max Planck Society and the University of Leipzig.
Author Details
1Institute for Medical Informatics, Statistics and Epidemiology, University of Leipzig, Leipzig, Germany, 2Department of 
Computer Science, University of Leipzig, Leipzig, Germany, 3Department for Evolutionary Genetics, Max Planck Institute 
for Evolutionary Anthropology, Leipzig, Germany and 4European Bioinformatics Institute, Wellcome Trust Genome 
Campus, Hinxton, Cambridge, CB10 1SD, UK
References
1. Eilbeck K, Lewis SE, Mungall CJ, Yandell M, Stein L, Durbin R, Ashburner M: The Sequence Ontology: a tool for the 
unification of genome annotations.  Genome Biology 2005, 6(5):R44.
2. Bard J, Rhee SY, Ashburner M: An ontology for cell types.  Genome Biology 2005, 6(2):R21.
3. Rosse C, Mejino JLV: A Reference Ontology for Biomedical Informatics: the Foundational Model of Anatomy.  
Journal of Biomedical Informatics 2003, 36(6):.
4. Ashburner M, Ball CA, Blake JA, Botstein D, Butler H, Cherry JM, Davis AP, Dolinski K, Dwight SS, Eppig JT, Harris MA, 
Hill DP, Tarver IL, Kasarskis A, Lewis S, Matese JC, Richardson JE, Ringwald M, Rubin GM, Sherlock G: Gene ontology: 
tool for the unification of biology. The Gene Ontology Consortium.  Nat Genet 2000, 25:25-29.
5. Smith B, Ceusters W, Klagges B, Köhler J, Kumar A, Lomax J, Mungall C, Neuhaus F, Rector AL, Rosse C: Relations in 
biomedical ontologies.  Genome Biol 2005, 6(5):.
6. Robinson PN, Köhler S, Bauer S, Seelow D, Horn D, Mundlos S: The Human Phenotype Ontology: a tool for 
annotating and analyzing human hereditary disease.  American journal of human genetics 2008, 83(5):610-615.
7. Mungall C, Gkoutos G, Smith C, Haendel M, Lewis S, Ashburner M: Integrating phenotype ontologies across 
multiple species.  Genome Biology 2010, 11:R2.
8. Hayamizu TF, Mangan M, Corradi JP, Kadin JA, Ringwald M: The Adult Mouse Anatomical Dictionary: a tool for 
annotating and integrating data.  Genome Biology 2005, 6(3):.
9. Aranguren ME, Antezana E, Kuiper M, Stevens R: Ontology Design Patterns for bio-ontologies: a case study on the 
Cell Cycle Ontology.  BMC Bioinformatics 2008, 9(Suppl 5):S1+.
10. Wright L: Functions.  Philosophical Review 1973.
11. Millikan RG: Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism MIT Press; 1988. 
12. Searle JR: The Construction of Social Reality Free Press; 1997. 
13. Hartmann N: Teleologisches Denken Walter de Gruyter; 1966. 
14. Burek P, Hoehndorf R, Loebe F, Visagie J, Herre H, Kelso J: A top-level ontology of functions and its application in 
the Open Biomedical Ontologies.  Bioinformatics 2006, 22(14):.
15. Burek P: Ontology of Functions.  In PhD thesis University of Leipzig, Institute of Informatics (IfI); 2006. 
16. Loebe F: Abstract vs. social roles - Towards a general theoretical account of roles.  Applied Ontology 2007, 2(2):.
17. Johansson I: Functions, Function Concepts and Scales.  The Monist 2004.
18. Lewis D: Finkish Dispositions.  The Philosophical Quarterly 1997, 47(187):143-158.
19. Hoehndorf R, Kelso J, Herre H: Contributions to the formal ontology of functions and dispositions: an application 
of non-monotonic reasoning.  Proceedings of the 11th Bio-Ontology Workshop 2009.
20. Golbreich C, Horrocks I: The OBO to OWL mapping, GO to OWL 1.1!  In Proceedings of the OWLED 2007 Workshop on 
OWL: Experiences and Directions, Innsbruck, Austria, Jun 6-7, of CEUR Workshop Proceedings Volume 258. Edited by: 
Golbreich C, Kalyanpur A, Parsia B. Aachen, Germany: CEUR-WS.org; 2007. 
21. Herre H, Heller B, Burek P, Hoehndorf R, Loebe F, Michalek H: General Formal Ontology (GFO) - A Foundational 
Ontology Integrating Objects and Processes [Version 1.0].  Onto-med report, Research Group Ontologies in 
Medicine, Institute of Medical Informatics, Statistics and Epidemiology, University of Leipzig, Leipzig; 2006. 
22. Grenon P: BFO in a Nutshell: A Bi-categorial Axiomatization of BFO and Comparison with DOLCE.  In Tech. rep 
University of Leipzig, Leipzig; 2003. 
23. Masolo C, Borgo S, Gangemi A, Guarino N, Oltramari A: WonderWeb Deliverable D18: Ontology Library (final).  In 
Tech. rep Laboratory for Applied Ontology, ISTC-CNR, Trento, Italy; 2003. 
24. Hoehndorf R, Loebe F, Kelso J, Herre H: Representing default knowledge in biomedical ontologies: Application to 
the integration of anatomy and phenotype ontologies.  BMC Bioinformatics 2007, 8:377.
25. Hoehndorf R, Loebe F, Poli R, Kelso J, Herre H: GFO-Bio: A biological core ontology.  Applied Ontology 2008, 
3(4):219-227.
Received: 6 December 2009 Accepted: 31 March 2010 
Published: 31 March 2010
This article is available from: http://www.jbiomedsem.com/content/1/1/4© 2010 Hoehndorf et al; licensee BioMed Central Ltd. is an Open Acc ss article distr but under th  terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.Journal of B omedi a  Semantics 2010, 1:4
Hoehndorf et al. Journal of Biomedical Semantics 2010, 1:4
http://www.jbiomedsem.com/content/1/1/4
Page 15 of 1526. Suchanek FM, Ifrim G, Weikum G, Buitelaar P, Cimiano P, Loos B: LEILA: Learning to Extract Information by 
Linguistic Analysis.  2006.
27. Ceusters W, Elkin P, Smith B: Referent Tracking: The Problem of Negative Findings.  Stud Health Technol Inform 
2006, 124:.
doi: 10.1186/2041-1480-1-4
Cite this article as: Hoehndorf et al., Applying the functional abnormality ontology pattern to anatomical functions 
Journal of Biomedical Semantics 2010, 1:4
